Pakistan is a weak country, close to being ungovernable, to the extent that too many elements within its society do not really recognize the legitimacy of popularly elected leaders.
Meanwhile, to the north, U.S. armed forces and their allies from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization fight to preserve the weak authority of Afghan President Hamid Karzai in Kabul against a resurgent Islamic fundamentalist Taliban.
On Pakistan's western border, tensions remain high with the nation's traditional enemy, India, which — like Pakistan — now has an arsenal of nuclear weapons and the ballistic missile systems to carry them.
Within Pakistan, the nation is also destabilized by a plethora of radical, violent Islamic sects, political movements and guerrilla groups that have proved themselves capable of mounting international terror and guerrilla operations.
These groups enjoy at least some support from the Pakistani armed forces and the nation's Inter Services Intelligence agency, and their prestige cannot be seriously challenged by the civilian authorities who are currently led by weak, cautious and increasingly ineffectual President Asif Ali Zardari, the widower of assassinated former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto.
Therefore, Pakistan remains a nation that is both weak and radicalized. The deep-rooted hostility toward and suspicion of India among Pakistan's military leaders continues to undermine efforts by the U.S. government to reduce tensions between Islamabad and New Delhi. Many, if not most, of Pakistan's military leaders believe the United States is in a conspiracy with India to prop up Karzai in Afghanistan and outflank Pakistan with enemies.
Western leaders must first recognize the magnitude and complexity of the military, political, economic and social problems facing Pakistan before they can start to develop any realistic strategies for dealing with these issues.
Is there, in fact, anything that the United States and the rest of the West can do beyond uttering the usual pious exhortations to all parties to stay calm and find peaceful solutions? Is there any way Washington and its allies can truly encourage the now democratically elected government of Pakistan to gain more legitimacy?
The grim answer is: probably not a lot, at least not directly. As U.S. policymakers discovered to their cost in both Afghanistan and Iraq, the West has few or no credible political or cultural alternatives to offer to troubled Muslim societies. The notion that the United States and its allies can help backward countries become modern by imposing "democracy therapy" through military force is not a good model, as has been demonstrated by the, at best, mixed results that the United States and its armed forces have experienced in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Part 4: Crafting a realistic economic and political strategy to restore stability and establish prosperity in Pakistan
(Paolo Liebl von Schirach is the editor of SchirachReport.com, a regular contributor to Swiss radio and an international economic-development expert.)
(United Press International's "Outside View" commentaries are written by outside contributors who specialize in a variety of important issues. The views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of United Press International. In the interests of creating an open forum, original submissions are invited.)
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