The fertile ground for radical violence in Pakistan is provided by various fundamentalist factions that prosper in this large, heavily populated, backward country with a population now probably in excess of 170 million but still afflicted by the added huge malady of permanent political immaturity.

In Pakistan, U.S. policymakers confront the dilemma of armed forces incapable of really leading the country to modernity but at the same time skeptical of the ability of democratically elected civilian governments and their leaders to accomplish the same goal.

So over the 62-year history of the independent Pakistan state, either military strongmen have ruled through the exercise of force or they reluctantly yield power to weak civilian governments that rapidly prove incapable of extricating themselves from the morass of feudal politics laced with corruption.

In this mess, Islamic radicalism prospers, as it seems capable of providing guidance and inspiration to significant segments of an otherwise disoriented population.

Pakistan's perennially unresolved Kashmir dispute with India, with nationalist and religious components, adds a huge element of constant frustration and paranoia against the more powerful and now more economically advanced neighbor. As a way to gain leverage in this dispute, the Pakistani government over time trained and enabled radical mujahedin guerrillas based on their side of the Line of Control in Kashmir who were willing to carry on the fight against the Indians. In so doing, however, Islamabad created violent agents who may now be beyond its direct control.

As a result, we have now the fairly popular paranoid notion among the people of Pakistan that their country remains under siege, ruled by agents of the United States, and that it is threatened by a vast conspiracy including the West and India.

This conspiratorial belief extends to at least some elements of the vast number of Pakistanis who have settled in Europe and the Middle East. This complicates matters, as Western governments and security services now face the problem of millions of people of Pakistani origin who now hold British passports and who freely travel back and forth between Britain and Pakistan. A small minority of them, still significant in their numbers and the potential threat they pose, have received and are receiving military training in Pakistan. Western security services already know that some of them have been engaged in violent plots on different continents.

In short, Pakistan is a weak country, close to being ungovernable, to the extent that too many elements within the society do not really recognize the legitimacy of popularly elected leaders.


Part 4: Why the Pakistani government does not dare to challenge the legitimacy of the radical Islamic groups that are undermining its control and effectiveness

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(Paolo Liebl von Schirach is the editor of SchirachReport.com, a regular contributor to Swiss radio and an international economic-development expert.)

(United Press International's "Outside View" commentaries are written by outside contributors who specialize in a variety of important issues. The views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of United Press International. In the interests of creating an open forum, original submissions are invited.)

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